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Abstract 
 This paper examines a role for Government Sponsored Entity’s (GSE) within the 
originate-to-distribute model (OTD).  The research determines if originated residential prime and 
subprime mortgages in the OTD market, have a positive correlation with housing foreclosures, by 
analyzing residential OTD rates in 2007 and comparing it to foreclosure rates in 2008 for all 51 
states in the United States.  This paper breaks down OTD mortgages into purchaser and loan type 
in order to determine a relationship between GSE OTD/government mortgage guarantees and 
foreclosure rates.  The paper has limited scope due to data limitations; however, our results 
indicate that higher levels of residential mortgage OTD rates on a state-wide level, causes 
foreclosure rates to increase in the US between 2007 and 2008.   
 
 
Keywords:  Government Sponsored Entity (GSE); Originate-to-distribute (OTD); Mortgage; 
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1.0 Introduction 
 “If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it”  
– Ronald Reagan (August 15, 1986) 
 This paper presents three innovations in the field of residential mortgage originations in 
the originate-to-distribute model (OTD), which have not been studied in detail in academic 
literature.  We go beyond previous research in the field by approaching the OTD industry from its 
impact on foreclosure rates; using this data to demonstrate that government involvement, through 
government sponsored entities (GSE), is a positive factor on foreclosures the following year.  The 
paper builds a strong conclusion from three unique angles:   
(I) The impact of prime and subprime mortgage OTD on foreclosure rates in each state, 
to motivate the need for intervention in the industry.  Is there positive relationship 
between OTD rates and foreclosures in the US?  
(II) The breakdown of OTD data into originated residential mortgage purchaser types, in 
order to observe the performance of GSE’s and other originators.  Is there a 
continued role for GSE’s in the OTD process?  
(III) The Separation of state OTD rates into loan types, to observe the success of 
government and conventional mortgages.  Is there evidence to support the role of 
government guarantees and insurances on mortgages within the OTD industry?   
 The research has been motivated by several factors which were uncovered during the data 
collection phase of the report.  A fascinating pattern exists in the residential housing data from 
2000-08: as the prevalence of OTD market increased, reaching $3.6 trillion USD in 2006, 
foreclosures increased across the country (Keys et al. 2010).  Looking further, into the OTD data 
provided by the federal government, there is a significant pattern on a statewide level. States that 
had the highest OTD rate as a percentage of their total mortgages originated in a year, had the 
highest foreclosure rates the following year.  Disregarding the prime/subprime classification, 
there is large body of research that classified OTD as a safe and positive process that improves 
liquidity within the market, drives down borrowing costs, and reduces/shifts the credit-risk of 
financial institutions (Anderson, Capozza and Van Order 2011; Demyanyk and Hemert 2008). 
However, our data uncovered that the popularity of the OTD model in residential mortgage 
origination, increases the likelihood of defaults the following year. 
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 Once sufficient evidence had been uncovered about the increased level of foreclosures 
among OTD mortgages, the particular players in the industry were researched.  The five largest 
players in the residential mortgage OTD market were analyzed by observing their origination 
volumes in 2007.  This revealed that GSE’s were a particularly strong performer from a reduced 
foreclosure point of view, which infers that their presence in the industry helps reduce foreclosure 
rates the following year.  As we continued to look at the OTD market in more detail, a negative 
correlation was found between government guaranteed loan types (VA, FHA, FSA/RHS) and 
foreclosure rates.  Conventional loans had strong positive correlation between OTD and 
foreclosures rates, and performed significantly poorer than government extended loans.  However 
this result is not conclusive due to the limitations and biases that are embedded within our data, 
which will be studied in further detail in section 4.  Please refer to appendix 7.4 for detailed 
breakdown of the OTD data set from HMDA. 
 Based on the strong statistical results of this paper and previous research in field, we 
support government involvement in the residential mortgage OTD market because all other 
financial institutions seem incapable at overcoming information asymmetry (adverse selection 
and moral hazard), leading to increased foreclosures.  Research indicates that OTD market has a 
positive correlation with foreclosures and we advocate for a continued presence of GSE’s within 
the mortgage origination process, as well as increased government monitoring of mortgages.  
This is necessary to protect investors within the OTD market (through securitizations, etc.), 
ensure stability of all financial markets, and keep markets highly liquid and efficient. 
1.1 Brief Background  
 The first residential mortgage-backed securities were created by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development in 1970; they were sold as securities by GSE’s (Apostolik, 
Donohue, and Went 2009).  Since then, the pervasiveness of the OTD market has transformed the 
mortgage/financial industry from a traditional “buy and hold,” to a “buy and sell” approach 
(Keys, Mukhergjee, Seru and Vig 2010).  The new approach, also known as the OTD model, has 
led to explosive growth in the mortgage origination industry (Butler 2009).  This poses a unique 
issue for regulators and government agencies, as the modern OTD process escalates agency risks 
that arise from the originator not suffering the consequences of a non-performing loan.  The 
specific type of risk, called moral hazard, has been shown to reduce the loan underwriting quality 
of an institution due to reduced incentives to extend high quality credit (Apostolik et al. 2009).  
Other risks that arise from the mortgage OTD industry include: inefficiencies between the 
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originator and investors (fees, tax, and mispricing), weak monitoring incentives of the originator, 
and renegotiation difficulties after the mortgage is sold (Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil 2013).  
Although the benefits of the OTD process have been heavily researched (Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan 
and Thomas 2011; Jiang et al. 2013) and is widely known to reduce credit risk and financing 
costs, the sharp spike in residential foreclosures from 2005-08 indicate that the process is 
negatively effecting residential housing market.   
 This research paper follows the structure: (i) Section II examines the relevant research 
literature and earlier empirical evidence on the OTD process and highlights the innovations made 
in the paper; (ii) Section III carefully reviews the data sources and analytical technique used 
throughout the papers research; (iii) Section IV examines the limitations of our data and results; 
(iv) Section V presents the empirical results of our OTD and foreclosure research; and (v) Section 
VI analyzes the results and presents the conclusion of our research. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
 The OTD industry is a heavily researched area of study that has established inconclusive 
results in determining whether the process of buying and selling residential mortgages, negatively 
influences the economy.  The body of research divides into three areas of focus: 1) subprime 
mortgage crisis analysis; 2) negative impacts of OTD; and, 3) the positive impacts of OTD.  
There is little research on the originators in the market and the quality of loans originated from 
these entities; even less literature exists on the effects of government involvement within the 
OTD industry.  The literature review will provide a brief examination of previous research in the 
field and point out key innovations that were discovered in this research paper. 
2.1 Previous Research 
 The largest body of research exists on the cause and effect of the subprime mortgage 
crisis and the role of OTD and securitization.  The researchers Gaied, Aloui, Salha and Nguyen 
(2012), study 6775 American banks over five years (2003-2007) to determine whether the role of 
loan securitization can explain the risk taking behaviour leading up to the subprime crisis.  They 
examine the general securitization of subprime loans by commercial banks (by looking at OTD 
percentages) and compare them to bank failures. Although it had been commonly perceived that 
securitization and the OTD model increased short-term bank profits, it has been shown in the 
long-run to decrease profitability and increase the exposure to default risk.  Similar research by 
Demyanyk and Hemert (2008), as well as Mian and Sufi (2009), examine mortgage and default 
data extensively to help clarify the body of research and determine the actual cause of the 2007-
08 financial crisis.  Both papers approach their research from three areas: income based, supply 
based, and expectations based; and find that the quality of mortgages deteriorated steadily since 
2001. 
 Another main category of research conducts analysis on information asymmetry in the 
OTD industry and its effects on lending standards and practices.  This includes research 
conducted by Keys et al. (2010), who determined whether the OTD process reduced incentives 
for financial institutions to screen prospective borrowers, by looking at credit scores.  By using 
the “rule of thumb,” an industry-wide cut-off for credit scores, the author demonstrates how 
securitized non-agency loans (non-GSE, also referred to as subprime in this paper) are susceptible 
to moral hazard, due to the OTD model.  They discover that the OTD model did affect the 
screening process of subprime loans, as loans just below the threshold were held to higher 
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screening standards than loans that were just above the cut-off.  This finding is further reinforced 
by Shi (2012), about whether strict mortgage broker licensing leads to higher lending standards 
and better mortgages.  The results conclude that higher regulation of the mortgage broker 
industry, leads to higher quality mortgages, as observed through lower default rates of loans.  The 
paper points out value in the broker screening process and a stringent examination process, when 
mortgages are used for OTD purposes. 
 Although the main area of research in the OTD model has focused on the negative 
impacts, there is another group of researchers who have uncovered some positive findings. Jiang 
et al. (2013) found the opposite conclusion, when examining the relationship between OTD and 
loan performance using a dataset from major commercial lenders.  Their evidence suggested that 
loans that remain on the balance sheet tend to have a higher delinquency rate than loans that are 
subsequently sold for securitization purposes.  This effect is caused by investors being able to see 
the loan characteristics after the loan is originated, therefore weeding out the poor performing 
loans.  Furthermore, Casu et al. (2011) investigated the impact of the OTD model on the credit 
risk taking behaviour of US bank holding companies (affiliate institutions), using data from 2001-
2007.  The authors found that there was a negative relationship between the securitization of 
mortgages, home equity loans, and consumer loans and credit risk, because banks become more 
risk averse as their balance sheet accumulates increased volume of securitization products. 
2.2 Innovation 
 Regardless of previous findings, this paper presents three innovations in the field of 
residential mortgages and the OTD model by studying the:  
(I) Impact of prime and subprime mortgage OTD market on foreclosure rates in each 
state to motivate the need for intervention within the residential mortgage industry. 
(II) State OTD rates by purchaser types, in order to observe the performance of GSE’s 
and other originators. 
(III) State OTD rates by loan types, to find which loan types perform the best, 
government or conventional.   
 This paper goes beyond previous research in the field by approaching the OTD industry 
from a perspective of foreclosures and the impact of government involvement; building a 
conclusion from two unique breakdowns not yet seen in academic literature.   
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 The first innovation made in our paper involved the inclusion of all originated 1-4 family 
dwelling residential mortgages, prime and subprime, in our data sample.  As cited above, many 
researchers in the field have analyzed the effect of subprime mortgages on different variables 
with different degrees of success; we set out to build a more robust relationship to determine the 
net effect on foreclosures.  The results reveal a strong positive correlation between all OTD and 
foreclosure rates, and produces consistent results within academic literature. This innovation was 
completed in order to build an argument against the prevalence of the OTD model in residential 
mortgages because of increases in foreclosure rates the following year. 
 The second innovation made to the general body of knowledge is the detailed breakdown 
of purchaser types into GSE’s, commercial banks, life insurance/credit unions, private 
institutions, and affiliates, in order to determine whether government originators have a positive 
impact on foreclosures and have a role within the industry.  There have been no published 
academic papers in our research that analyze the purchaser type of all mortgages in the OTD 
market on a per state basis.  This innovation identifies the main players within the OTD industry, 
gauges their level of involvement in each U.S. state, and evaluates their mortgages’ performance.  
While other papers have broken down purchaser types (Anderson et al. 2011) in the OTD 
industry, they have never included prime and subprime mortgages, and never approached it from 
a pro-government perspective.  The innovation is the first of its kind in OTD literature, which 
finds evidence to support a government role in the OTD market for 2007-08. 
 The last innovation included within the field of research is the further breakdown of OTD 
mortgages by loan types: conventional and government guaranteed (VA, FHA, and FSA/RHS).  
This was included to provide evidence for the positive influence that government loans appears to 
have on the OTD industry through reduced foreclosures.  The breakdown was also conducted to 
provide sufficient evidence against conventional mortgage loan types and motivate the need for 
continued support in government guaranteed loans where appropriate.  Once again, there are no 
other published works, which have broken down originated securities into loan types for 
determining a role for government entities.  This is an important innovation to current academic 
literature because we find evidence that supports the role government guarantees within the 
mortgage OTD industry for 2007-08.  No other papers have analyzed the OTD mortgage types 
from a government perspective, which is new to the academic literature that was reviewed. 
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3.0 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 This research uses two main data sources to build the relationship between OTD rates and 
foreclosures; the data segment will be broken into two sections: the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) and Foreclosure.com.  These sections aim to explain the research data in detail and 
provide a background into the methodology and analysis process. 
3.1.1 HMDA 
 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted in 1975 and implemented 
through Regulation C, on July 21, 2011 (Gupta, Sharma and Mitchem 2010).  The HMDA has 
two main purposes within the mortgage industry.  The first purpose of HMDA is to provide 
public information on housing data, financial institutions, and lending patterns within geographic 
regions.  This data is collected by the government to ensure that financial institutions are meeting 
the needs of all US citizens (regardless of where they preside) in order to reduce discriminatory 
lending (Gupta et al. 2010).  The second purpose of the HMDA, is to aid the government in 
targeting private and public investment to areas of the country requiring government support; this 
increases the efficiency of the federal governments tax spending.  The HMDA resources are 
collected and maintained on an annual basis by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) and this information is released electronically and can be viewed publically 
(“HMDA Data” 2014).  The HMDA data source is unique and the only information provider to 
track the total amount of originated mortgages in a specified year, along with a wealth of 
additional information and features.   
 Our data targets all originated, 1-4 family dwelling mortgages, in 51 states of the USA 
(excluding Puerto Rico) for 2007, in an attempt to uncover residential mortgage OTD patterns 
and to determine if a government presence has a positive impact on foreclosures between 2007-
08.  Puerto Rico was excluded due to its isolation from the US housing market and status as a 
tourist destination, which can add a bias to our OTD/foreclosure results.  By limiting the search 
parameters on the HMDA database to only cover originated mortgages of 1-4 family dwelling 
homes (non-manufactured), the research looks at smaller sized, residential loans, rather than 
larger commercial property loans which generally require higher documentation levels and 
collateral (Gregory 2012).  Limiting the search to mortgages originated within 2007, only new 
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mortgages were examined, not recycled loans from previous years outside our field of research.  
By utilizing data that only covers originated residential mortgages in the United States for one 
year, we were able to pin point a specific time within the OTD market.  This will allow us to 
build a clear relationship, without adding other economic or environmental factors that 
inadvertently cause a bias in the results.  Refer to appendix 7.2 for raw data and appendix 7.4 for 
detailed breakdown of the data set. 
 For our analysis, a unique period was examined, which uncovered a strong relationship 
between our underlying variables.  We chose the year 2007 for our OTD data because many 
researchers and analysts in the field (Keys et al. 2010; Gaied et al. 2012) believe this was a 
stressed period in the OTD market, particularly in subprime credit.  This will also provide insight 
into a time that experienced some of the most extreme foreclosure rates in US history and 
arguably, the weakest lending standards (Keys et al. 2010).  The 2007 OTD data was broken 
down into state-level detail in order to uncover a pattern in different OTD procedures in diverse 
geographic regions across the country.  The breakdown provides enough data points, 51 or 49 
degrees of freedom (dof), to describe a relationship between two variables, while being efficient 
from a data application perspective.  To build the relationship between OTD and foreclosure 
rates, the volume of OTD loans (or origination count) were compared to the total number of 
foreclosures in 2008.  The dollar value of mortgages were not utilized because of its relative 
complexity and its inability to add any additional level of clarity to the thesis. 
3.1.2 Foreclosure.com 
 For our data on foreclosures, we utilized statistics from the research of Lucy and Herlitz 
(2009), who conducted detailed analysis on foreclosure data for 2008; the data was obtained from 
Foreclosure.com.  Foreclosure.com is the US’s largest database of distressed properties and 
contains detailed information on pre-foreclosures, bankruptcy, and tax liens across the country 
(“Foreclosure Data” 2014).  This data source was selected over a competitor like RealtyTrac 
because it was readily available through the research of Lucy and Herlitz (2009). Furthermore, 
RealtyTrac reported more than double the amount of foreclosures in 2008 than Foreclosure.com 
because their data source recorded more than 860,000 repossessed properties by lender (not 
foreclosed).  Refer to appendix 7.3 for raw data. Foreclosure.com proved to be more accurate for 
the purposes of this research.   
The total number of foreclosures and pre-foreclosures in the US in 2008 was 1,009,485, 
which according to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2014) was 0.79% of 
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2007 housing units.  Foreclosures in 2008 were highly concentrated in four states: California, 
Florida, Nevada, and Arizona; constituting 62% of the US foreclosure total and 87% of national 
housing price declines (Lucy and Herlitz 2009).  By using the year 2008 as a proxy for our 
foreclosure rate, the results will use a highly concentrated data set that has a high level of 
foreclosures in order to obtain significant results.  We also utilized 2008 foreclosure data because 
during the 2007-08 era, many housing foreclosures occurred very quickly after the loan was 
extended; however, the period examined in our research is one of the major limitations in our 
papers research (Lucy and Herlitz 2009). 
3.2 Methodology 
The research begins with a broad overview of the OTD industry and its relation to the 
foreclosure rate within a particular state.  This motivated our main body of research and topic of 
this paper: whether there is a role for government-sponsored institutions in the OTD industry, 
through originations and guarantees.  The first government analysis classified the percentage of 
all OTD mortgages by institution type (five different class types) and compared them to the total 
foreclosure rate in each state the following year.  The quality of each purchaser type was 
determined by the positive or negative relationship between the percentage of OTD mortgages by 
that institution and the total foreclosure rates in each state.  Our second government-level 
assessment segregated the total amount of OTD loans by percentage of loan type in order to 
determine whether government guaranteed mortgages, such a FHA or VA, result in lower 
foreclosure rates.  We conducted our analysis using a linear OLS regression, and analysed two 
statistics for accuracy: adjusted R-square and t-test. 
3.2.1 OLS Regression Analysis 
 Regression analysis predicted a relationship between a selected variable (OTD rates) and 
an observed outcome (foreclosure rates); it is essentially a line of best fit between two variables 
(Hoy, Livernois, McKenna, Rees, and Stengos 2001).  Using linear regression in the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model, we can create a robust formula that can fit our real-word data.   
 1       𝑌 = 𝑎𝑋 + 𝑏 
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 The linear regression function in equation (1) is a standard pre-set regression formula 
within a worksheet in Excel.  We have decided to present the linear regression form, over the log 
or exponential format because of it’s intuitive nature and relative ease to build a strong argument 
within the research paper.  Another important aspect of the linear regression formula is its ability 
to provide a precise best-fit line with very few data inputs; however, the more data points utilized, 
the more convincing the research becomes because its dof increases. 
3.2.2 Statistic Analysis 
 The adjusted R-square value is used to measure how well the OLS linear regression 
formula in equation (1), fit the real-world OTD and foreclosure data.  In statistical terms, “the R-
square is the square of the correlation between the response values and the predicted response 
values,” and is called the coefficient of multiple determination (“R-square” 2014).   
 
2       𝑅! = 1 − [ 𝑤! 𝑦! −   𝑓! !  !!!!    𝑤! 𝑦! −   𝑦!" !]  
!
!!! =   1 − [𝑆𝑆𝐸 𝑆𝑆𝑇] 
 3       𝑅! = 1 − [ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑑𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑑𝑓 ] 
 
 The adjusted R-square coefficient (3) was used in this research paper over the simpler R-
square term (2) because the data in our research is a small sample of the population of mortgages 
and foreclosures in the US.  Since we did not include the entire universe of data in our data set, 
there is a high probability that there is some bias in our sample.  In fact, one of the disadvantages 
with R-square analysis is that an increase in the number of data point’s results in a larger value of 
R-square regardless of how well the extra data explains the relationship (“R-square” 2014).  
When R-square is used incorrectly, it can over inflate the OLS regression’s ability to explain the 
variance in the relationship.  The adjusted R-square analysis is used because of the small sample 
size (relative to the population) and its ability to filter out noise/bias that can artificially inflate the 
relationships strength.   
 The two-sample t-test with unequal sample size and variance was used, with a 95% 
confidence level rather of a one-tail test because we wanted to capture the variance on both sides 
of the coefficient error term (standard deviation) to get a complete picture of the relationships 
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statistical significance.  The t-statistic was utilized over the P-value approach because we can 
analyse one value instead of providing a range of values.  
 4       𝑡 =    𝑋! −   𝑋!𝑠!! −   𝑠!! 
 
 Formula (4) represents the t-stat calculation for a two-sample t-test.  The paper utilizes a 
two-tail t-test on each coefficients standard error term in order to determine which terms are 
significant for our research.  The t-stat calculated in equation (4) is compared to the critical two-
tail t-value of 2.009575 (using 49 dof) to determine the level of significance of the error term with 
95% confidence.  One drawback of statistical tests like the t-test, is that it relies heavily on 
unrealistic assumptions and other unknown characteristics of your data set; the test choice is 
susceptible to human error (Vogelvang 2005).  Regardless, the t-test is a useful tool to determine 
whether our results have sufficient data points to draw a reliable academic conclusion about 
foreclosures and OTD. 	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4.0 Limitations of Research 
 This paper has a solid linear regression relationship and the results are statistically 
significant; however, two limitations occurred during the data collection phase.  Limitations on 
OTD and foreclosure data caused the research to be less thorough than originally intended 
because only one year of data was utilized for OTD (2007) and foreclosure (2008) rates.  The 
drawbacks signify a need for further research in the field and help to highlight areas that require 
further investigation by other researchers, as explained below.    
4.1 OTD Data 
 The first limitation relates to the OTD data that we obtained from the FFIEC’s website, 
which contained HMDA mortgage information.  During our research, we uncovered a program 
available from the federal government that could data mine specific years of HMDA data and 
export it to an Excel CSV file; parameters were selected using drop down menus to ensure the 
correct data was applied.  However, the program was only available from the year 2007 onwards; 
without it, we would have to do extremely time consuming manual data entry into an Excel 
spreadsheet.  For the scope of our research, one year was sufficient to build a simple relationship 
for a specific period of 2007-08, however further data should be used to observe if this pattern 
continues to persist.  More years of data would reduce the time bias in our data and help explain a 
more powerful and robust relationship over a longer period.  Older (up to 2004) and current data 
(up to 2013) could be mined manually using a programming language, such as VBA or Matlab, or 
be ordered from the federal government for a fee.   
 The other limitation regarding OTD data is the actual data source itself.  Although we 
used a reliable government agency for our research, there are errors contained in the data, such as 
incomplete or missing information in certain entries.  For example, under the purchaser type 
section of our research, we had a group of institutions called “others/affiliates.”  The ‘other’ in the 
title, was generally used by the data collection agency when a data field was left blank or filled in 
incorrectly; this can skew the results by placing certain mortgages in an incorrect category (Gupta 
et al. 2010).  More research is required to research the details behind this purchaser type and other 
examples like it and possibly try to eliminate entries that contain errors or incomplete 
information.  By doing so, the mortgage sample size would be reduced but would create a more 
realistic representation.  
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4.2 Foreclosure Data 
 The second limitation lies within the foreclosure data obtained from Foreclosure.com, 
one of the industry leaders in foreclosure data reporting (“Forelosure Data” 2014).  Throughout 
the research collection process, it was difficult to find foreclosure data on a per state basis due to 
the cost of obtaining a reliable database.  We had originally contacted RealtyTrac, based out of 
California, about obtaining five years of foreclosure data from 2005-09, but the cost was 
prohibitively expensive and could not proceed. We did manage to locate one source with a year 
of free foreclosure data for 2008.  The researchers, Lucy and Herlitz (2009), conducted detailed 
analysis on the foreclosure rates on every US state in 2008, and obtained the data from 
Foreclosure.com.  We had originally expected to analyze the foreclosure rates for a range of years 
(and compare to OTD rates), but due to financial reasons, were unable to do so.  Further research 
should be conducted using more years of foreclosure data to substantiate the effects of the OTD 
process. Loans generally default over a period of 1-5 years and the data should reflect this in 
order to increase the impact of the results (Hull 2012).  
 Sources such as Foreclosure.com and ReatyTrac are prone to biases and errors imbedded 
within the data, and information could vary widely from one source to the next.  When 
conducting future research on this topic, it is important to keep in mind that the chosen data 
source could have drastic impacts on the result.  For example, the foreclosure data on RealtyTrac 
for 2008 included more than double the amount of mortgages that were found on 
Foreclosure.com’s database (Lucy and Herlitz 2009).  RealtyTrac included default mortgages that 
were repossessed by the lender, which would have been inappropriate for this paper. 
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5.0 Empirical Results 
 The results have been obtained through intensive research into residential mortgage OTD 
and foreclosure in the US, represented by a group of simple relationships between 2007 HMDA 
mortgage OTD data and foreclosure data on mortgages in 2008 between all 51 US states 
(excluding Puerto Rico).  We begin the empirical results section by building a relationship 
between total mortgage OTD and total foreclosure rates in order to determine, on a highly robust 
level, whether OTD has a positive correlation with foreclosure rates.  The last two sections of our 
results build a more specific relationship between the role of the federal government in the OTD 
process, using GSE’s and mortgage guarantees, and total foreclosures at the state level.  The 
relationship found that the OTD model increased foreclosure rates the following year for 2007-08 
and substantiates the need for continued a government presence in OTD market and mortgage 
lending. 
5.1 Total OTD and Foreclosure Analysis 
5.1.1 Background 
The first analysis of OTD and foreclosure rates produces a robust relationship between 
total OTD mortgages (prime and subprime) and their corresponding foreclosure rates on a state 
level.  Numerous academic literature exists, outlining the subprime OTD process and its cause 
and effect on the financial crisis of 2007-08 (Anderson et al. 2011; Demyanyk and Hemert 2008), 
subprime mortgage foreclosures (Keys et al. 2010), and bank defaults (Gaied et al. 2012).  
However, very little analysis has been undertaken on the OTD model of prime and subprime 
mortgages and whether it is positively correlated with foreclosures on a state level.  We found 
that the foreclosure rate increases, as the percentage of total OTD increases during the specific 
period of 2007-08, concluding a positive relationship between the two variables.  Our results are 
similar to finding by Keys et al. (2010), who demonstrated that the high persistence of OTD in 
subprime mortgages during 2001-2007 caused a 10-25% increase in foreclosure rates due to 
decreased lending standards, as observed by FICO scores; this provides evidence that our 
methodology and results are in line with the current body of academic knowledge.  Our research 
takes their result one-step further, by building a more robust relationship between all OTD 
mortgages and foreclosure rates, in order to shape our argument for continued government 
involvement. 
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5.1.2 Total OTD 
 Utilizing the linear regression function shows a strong positive relationship between the 
total foreclosure rate in 2008 and the OTD rate in each state, as a percentage of total originated 
mortgages in 2007.  Equation (5) is the linear regression line utilized using the OLS method; the 
t-stat line below refers to each coefficients t-stat on the standard error term, which is compared to 
the critical t-stat of 2.009575 (using 49 dof).  Refer to appendix 7.1.1. 
 5       𝑌 = 0.0641𝑋 − 0.0349      
      t-stat       (3.796631)         (-3.29643)          
 
The regression formula above, indicates that an increase in the level of OTD mortgages 
in a particular state (as a function of total originations), corresponds to an increase in the level of 
foreclosures the following year.  This shows that the prevalence of OTD process in the residential 
mortgage market in 2007 put upward pressure on the foreclosure rate in each respective state.  
The level of total OTD varies widely per state, ranging from 46 – 73% of total originated 
mortgages, with a mean of 62.5% and variance of 0.321%.  Foreclosure rates per state operate 
within a tight band between .01 – 4.10%, with a mean of 0.514% and very small variance 
of  5.803𝐸!!.  Our regression analysis indicates that states with low levels of OTD, have low 
levels of foreclosures the following year.  
The positive regression result is reinforced by the calculated adjusted R-square value of 
0.2115 or 21.15%, which produced the second highest value of all other relationships explored 
within this paper.  The value is lower than the R-square value of 0.2273 or 22.73%, indicating the 
adjusted values superiority in evaluating relationships variance.  This indicates that approximately 
21% of our relationship’s variation can be explained by our linear regression analysis. Although 
this figure appears to be low, R-square and adjusted R-square values above 50% in academic 
disciplines involving the prediction of human behaviour are extremely rare because of the random 
nature of decisions; our adjusted R-square result sufficiently explains the variation in the given 
linear relationship’s regression (“R-Square” 2014). 
 The strong positive relationship, as demonstrated by the corresponding linear regression 
equation in formula (5) and adjusted R-square value, is strengthened by the use of two-tail t-test 
analysis in order to prove that the standard errors are statistically significant.  For our paper, we 
assumed unequal variances and a 95% confidence interval.  The total OTD slope and intercept 
coefficient’s standard error had a calculated t-stat that was sufficiently larger than the two-tail 
critical t-stat of 2.009575.  This indicates that the predicted slope coefficient is statistically 
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significant and greater than or less than zero respectively.  Regardless, there is sufficient evidence 
to support our belief that the OTD market is negatively impacting mortgage foreclosure rates in 
2007-08; further analysis will examine whether there is a negative relationship between GSE’s in 
the OTD market and foreclosure rates. 
5.2 OTD by Purchaser Type 
5.2.1 Background 
 The second major analysis section involves the detailed breakdown of all originated OTD 
loans by purchaser type, by comparing the percentage of OTD of each financial institution to 
foreclosure rates in each state.  The research follows the methodology of Keys et al. (2010), 
however we differentiate our study by breaking down the purchaser types into five sub-groups: 
GSE’s (Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac), commercial banks, private 
institutions, life insurance companies/credit unions, and other/affiliates.  The OTD rate, as total of 
each states total OTD mortgages, of each institution is compared to the foreclosure rate in each 
state, in an attempt to find a difference in the quality of originated OTDs between government 
and non-government entities.   
 Our results indicated that GSE’s and commercial banks had a relatively strong negative 
relationship between OTD and foreclosure rates. This demonstrates that the mortgage lending 
practices at these institutions are stronger, resulting in less mortgage foreclosures the following 
year.  Life insurance and credit unions also had a weak negative relationship between 
foreclosures and OTD rates at these institutions.  Private OTD, also known as subprime, had a 
strongly positive relationship when compared to foreclosures, which indicated that they are less 
successful at overcoming moral hazard in the OTD market; other and affiliate institutions, such as 
bank holding companies, had a weak positive relationship.  The results are in-line with previous 
literature that find private purchaser types lead to asymmetric information in the market caused 
by the OTD and lax lending standards and controls (Keys et al. 2010; Demiroglu and James 
2012).  Other research by Sarmiento (2012) and Shi (2012) provided further evidence that GSE’s 
are a positive force in the OTD market by determining that their lending standards are higher and 
more standardized, resulting in less defaults.   
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5.2.2 Government Sponsored Entities (GSE) 
 GSE’s, better known as prime mortgages or agency loans, have a strong negative 
relationship between OTD rate and foreclosure rates the following year, as evidenced by the 
linear regression analysis, calculated R-square value, and the t-test for statistical significance.  
GSE originated mortgages had a mean of 37.5%, with a small variance of 0.321%, indicating that 
government entities are prevalent in most states in the US. Refer to appendix 7.1.2. 
 6       𝑌 = −0.0428𝑋 + 0.0225 
      t-stat            (-2.3453)            (3.0094) 
 
The regression breakdown indicates a negative relationship between the GSE OTD 
volume of all originated mortgages in 2007 and foreclosure rates the following year.  This result 
means that states exhibiting high levels of GSE OTD rates, gives rise to lower levels of mortgage 
defaults.  The argument for increased involvement of GSE’s in the OTD industry is enhanced by 
the adjusted R-square calculation of 0.0826 or 8.26%, which was the sixth highest value of all 
regressions completed.  This value indicated that our linear regression formula (6) explains 
approximately 8% of relationships total variation, which is considered a decent result for the type 
of analysis conducted.   
A two-sample t-test was conducted on our GSE OTD sample, assuming unequal 
variances and a 95% confidence interval, and produced a t-stat of -2.3453 for the GSE coefficient 
error term, which was much greater than the critical two-tail t-stat of 2.009575 (using 49 dof). 
The intercept term, foreclosures, produced a t-stat of 3.0094, and was also above to the critical 
value.  This indicates that both regression coefficients are statistically greater or less than zero 
and are considered significant.  The relationship is meaningful in demonstrating the success of 
GSE’s in the OTD industry during 2007-08 due to the relatively strong adjusted R-square value 
and consistency with previous academic literature on the OTD process. 
5.2.3 Private Institutions 
 Private institutions have historically been the underwriters and originators of subprime 
mortgages, or non-agency loans, which do not meet the strict guidelines of GSE’s: loan size, 
underwriting quality, and borrower credit worthiness (Butler 2009).  The subprime mortgages 
were bundled and sold as non-agency securities, which had been increasing in importance, 
especially during 1995-2005 when the total value of outstanding securities increased from $65 to 
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$500 billion USD (Keys, Mukhergjee, Seru and Vig 2009).  Although the private OTD market 
consisted of only 3.31% of all OTD loans in the US, the magnitude of the dollar value is a 
problem because private institutions have a strong positive relationship between OTD rates and 
foreclosures.  Refer to appendix 7.1.3. 
 7       𝑌 = 0.3408𝑋 − 0.0061 
     t-stat          (4.1842)           (-2.1550) 
 
 The linear regression utilized in formula (7) indicated that there was an extremely strong 
positive relationship between the OTD rate of private institutions and foreclosure rates the 
following year.  This means that the level of mortgage foreclosures, on a statewide basis, 
increases as the level of OTD mortgages by private institutions increases; the private coefficient 
of 0.3408 in equation (7), is the strongest positive relationship of all institutions analyzed.  This 
supports our view of a stronger government role because private institutions have historically 
demonstrated poor lending standards and misaligned incentives caused by the OTD market (Keys 
et al. 2009).  The regression analysis is supported by the highest calculated adjusted R-square 
value of 0.2482 or 24.82%, indicating that our relationship explains 25% of the variance between 
OTD and foreclosure rates. 
 A two-sample statistical significance t-test was conducted to confirm that the results were 
meaningful within a 95% confidence level.  This resulted in a t-stat value of 4.1842 for the 
private coefficient standard error, which is significantly larger than the critical t-stat value of 
2.009575 (using 49 dof); a t-stat of -2.1550 was produced for the foreclosure intercept term.  The 
strong positive relationship between the private coefficient and foreclosures is statistically 
significant, which provides further evidence regarding the negative impacts of private institutions 
in the residential mortgage market.  Previous literature supports our findings and further 
strengthens the argument for a continued government presence in the OTD market. 
5.2.4 Commercial Banks 
 Commercial banks were found to have the strongest negative relationship of all the 
purchaser types examined in our research.  Commercial banks have demonstrated that they are 
very strong at containing risk during the OTD process; however, they make up a small proportion 
of total OTD at 7.18%, the second smallest player in the market.  
Previous research is conflicted about the negative relationship we uncovered in our 
research.  Our findings are inconsistent with Gaied et al. (2012), who claim that excessive risk 
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taking behaviour is prevalent among commercial banks, as witnessed by the correlation between 
bank defaults and the volume of OTD.  However, our results are consistent with discoveries by 
Jiang et al. (2013) who conducted research on the ex-ante and ex-post relationship between loan 
performance and loan sale.  This trend is clearly visible in formula (8) because the slope of the 
regression line is steeply downward sloping with a commercial coefficient of -0.0808, which is 
consistent with sound lending procedures and practices. Refer to appendix 7.1.4. 
 8       𝑌 =   −0.0808𝑋 + 0.0109 
   t-stat               (-1.6772)           (3.0273) 
 
 The linear regression analysis indicated that as commercial banks increase the amount of 
OTD within a specific state, the level of home foreclosures decreased the following year.  
However, the impact of our result has been reduced due to the minor adjusted R-square value of 
0.0350 or 3.5%, which is considered to be on the lower end of the spectrum.  This result indicates 
that there could be some other variable causing the variation within the linear relationship, other 
than OTD rates of commercial banks.  The data is statistically insignificant for the slope 
coefficient with a t-stat of -1.6772 and the intercept value is significant with a t-stat of 3.0273.  
This means that the one of two coefficients in equation (8) are not statistically greater or less than 
zero, and therefore do not affect the predicted result.  Regardless, further analysis will need to be 
conducted to clarify the ambiguity of our regression fit and to see if the prevalence of commercial 
OTD mortgages reduces foreclosures the following year.   
5.2.5 Life Insurance and Credit Unions 
 Life insurance companies and credit unions consisted of approximately 11.36% of total 
OTD products in 2007, which was the third largest participant within the industry.  Life insurance 
companies contribute to the OTD market, primarily through the issue of Catastrophe (Cat) bonds, 
which dominated all other insurance security products with approximately $31 billion of risk 
capital (total bond value and payments) issued between 1997 and 2010 (B. Hagendorff, J. 
Hagendorff, Keasey and Gonzalez 2014).  Credit unions make up a small portion of this 
purchaser type; however, they would conduct business within the OTD market using a procedure 
similar to a commercial bank (Apostolik et at. 2009).  
 9       𝑌 =   −0.0369𝑋 + 0.0093 
     t-stat              (-0.7652)            (1.6706) 
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The results indicate that there was a weak negative relationship between life 
insurance/credit union’s OTD and foreclosure rates in each US state.  This means that as the 
volume of OTD increases by this purchaser type, there is a weak positive impact on the overall 
home foreclosure rate, as observed in equation (9).  The relationship is negatively impacted by a 
calculated adjusted R-square value of -0.0084 or -0.84%, the lowest of all values; indicates that 
none of the variation in our relationship is explained by the regression analysis.  This means that 
the results regression analysis must be researched further to determine a more concrete 
relationship using a better predictor variable.  The two sample t-test indicated that both 
coefficients standard error terms were statistically insignificant, producing a t-stat of -0.07652 
and 1.6706 respectively, that is well below the critical t-stat of 2.009575 (using 49 dof).  This 
means that our data was insufficient to conduct proper academic analysis, and could not explain a 
relationship between OTD and foreclosures that are associated with life insurance companies and 
credit unions.  Refer to appendix 7.1.5. 
5.2.6 Other and Affiliate Institutions 
 The last category of loan purchaser type was other and affiliate institutions, which 
generally consist of bank holding companies and other off-balance sheet shell companies of large 
commercial banks; these act as agents in the securitization process (“HMDA Data” 2014).  This is 
the largest group of OTD users throughout the US, with 37.5% of all OTD mortgages belonging 
to these institutions.  Refer to appendix 7.1.6.  
 10     𝑌 = 0.0507𝑋 − 0.0139 
        t-stat        (2.7129)            (-1.9591) 
 
Despite the large size of this purchasers market, there was a positive relationship between 
OTD rates and foreclosures, with the third smallest linear regression coefficient of 0.0507.  This 
means that there is a small positive increase in foreclosure rates, as the magnitude of OTDs by 
affiliate institutions increases.  The regression analysis is strengthened by a calculated adjusted R-
square value of 0.1128 or 11.28%, which points to 11% of the variation being explained by the 
regression.  The data’s error terms for the slope coefficient was statistically significant, within a 
95% confidence interval, generating a t-stat value of 2.7129, which is above the critical t-stat of 
2.009575 (using 49 dof); the intercept term was not statistically significant.  Regardless of the 
statistical significance test, the strong R-square value and consistency with previous findings 
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provide significant evidence for a positive relationship between foreclosure and other/affiliate 
OTD in 2007-08. 
Our results are similar to findings by Casu et al. (2011) that indicated that there was an 
ambiguous relationship between the OTD volume of affiliate institutions and soundness of the 
banking system; however, the outcome depended on structure of the OTD product.  The positive 
relationship demonstrated with our papers linear regression analysis concludes the same result. 
5.3 OTD by Loan Type 
5.3.1 Background 
 The third and final analysis section involves the breakdown of originated OTD loans into 
four different types: conventional, FHA insured, VA guaranteed, and FSA/RHS.  The first loan 
type, conventional, consists of typical mortgages that are not eligible for government insurance or 
guarantees.  The last three loan types consist of three different government sponsored programs 
that aid underprivileged or provide veteran assistance to those in need.  FHA insured mortgages, 
or Federal Housing Administration mortgages, allow lower income American families to buy a 
house that they would otherwise not be able to afford without federal assistance.  VA guaranteed 
mortgages, or Veteran Affairs mortgages, are designed to provide long-term financing to war 
veterans and their surviving spouses in order for them to afford a house.  Lastly, FSA/RHS 
mortgages, or Rural Housing Service mortgages, is government assistance provided for farm 
housing purposes to aid small communities in the rural US (Anderson et al. 2011) 
 We conduct our research in order to determine, with more clarity, whether more 
government involvement in the mortgage OTD industry has a positive influence on foreclosure 
rates the following year.  Our research methodology closely follows Anderson et al. (2011), who 
also broke OTD loans into loan types and compared the breakdown to decreasing loan 
underwriting standards.  However, the researchers did not study the impact of government-
sponsored mortgages in the OTD market with respect to foreclosure rates on a statewide level.  
One prevalent detail of the author’s data was the major decrease in government-insured 
mortgages, from 7.4% in 2001 to 2.7% in 2005, and the corresponding increase in mortgage 
default rates after 2005.  The author’s results are similar to our findings, which provided 
additional support for continued government involvement in the OTD industry.   
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5.3.2 Conventional Mortgages 
 Conventional mortgages, as classified by the HMDA, are all mortgages that are not 
eligible for government sponsorship or support and may include prime, subprime, or Alt-A loans 
(Gupta 2010).  This class of loans are not involved with the government in any formal way, 
except through GSE’s as outlined in the previous analysis section.  Refer to appendix 7.1.7.  
 11       𝑌 = 0.0625𝑋 − 0.0517 
      t-stat           (2.6524)              (-2.41) 
 
We have determined through our linear regression formula (11), that there was a positive 
relationship between conventional mortgage OTD and foreclosure rates in the following year.  
This means that the more prevalent conventional mortgages are in a specific state, the higher the 
foreclosure rates will be during 2007-08.  This result is supported by an adjusted R-square 
calculation of 0.1077 or 10.77%, which means that only a small portion of the variation in the 
error terms are explained by the linear regression. However, due to the minor adjusted R-square 
values that have been found in previous sections, we consider this to be a strong result.  A two-
tail t-test was conducted on the each coefficient’s error term and was determined statistically 
significant, with a t-stat of 2.6524 for the conventional error term and -2.41 for the foreclosure 
error term.  These were both above the critical t-stat of 2.009575 (using 49 dof) and indicate that 
both coefficient terms are statistically greater than or less than zero respectively.  The fourth 
highest adjusted R-square in our research and consistency with previous findings by Anderson et 
al. (2011), provide sufficient evidence of the positive relationship with conventional loans and 
foreclosures. 
5.3.3 FHA Insured Mortgages 
 FHA mortgages are the most common form of government support within the mortgage 
OTD realm, with a market share of 6.3% in 2007.  The results indicated that there was a negative 
correlation between the OTD volume of FHA mortgages and foreclosure rates the following year.  
Federal Housing Administration loans should continue to be utilized in the OTD market because 
it appears to have a positive effect on the foreclosure rates in each state.  Refer to appendix 7.1.8.   
 12       𝑌 = −0.0831𝑋 + 0.0104 
      t-stat              (-2.2774)           (4.1222) 
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 As observed in formula (12), the FHA coefficient of -0.0831 was the fifth highest 
magnitude of all regressions completed in this research.  The adjusted R-square calculation, at 
0.0773 or 7.73%, was a high value when compared to all other regressions, demonstrating that 
this relationship holds meaning; the variation in the data is described well by the FHA OTD rate.  
The two-sample t-test was also conducted and returned a t-stat of -2.2774 and 4.1222; the 
foreclosure intercept term and slope terms were both statistically significant.  The statistical 
significance indicates that the intercept and slope coefficient term is significantly less than or 
greater than zero and is sufficient within a 95% confidence interval.   
5.3.4 VA Guaranteed Mortgages 
 VA guaranteed loans are loans that are extended to war veterans and their families – the 
loans are highly documented and well tracked by numerous government agencies (Anderson et al. 
2011).  The breakdown of loan types uncovers that this type of guarantee is very rare and only 
accounted for 2.14% of the total originated OTDs in the market in 2007.  Refer to appendix 7.1.9. 
 13       𝑌 =   −0.1216𝑋 +   0.0077 
       t-stat                (-1.8432)            (4.4086) 
 
 The regression analysis specifies that there is a negative relationship between VA 
guaranteed loans and foreclosure rates in the following year.  Formula (13) shows that the VA 
coefficient value of -0.1216, is a very strong negative result and indicates that VA loans result in 
less foreclosures the following year, than conventional mortgages.  The generated adjusted R-
square value of 0.0458 or 4.58% demonstrates that the results are poor at describing the variation 
in the linear regression analysis.  The t-test provided further evidence that our intercept error term 
was statistically significant, producing a value of 4.4086, however the VA coefficient error term 
was not, with a t-stat of -1.8432.  Regardless of the statistical significance test, the negative 
relationship and consistency with previous academic findings indicate that OTD VA guaranteed 
mortgages have a negative relationship with foreclosures. The result is consistent with findings by 
Anderson et al. (2011) who found that high levels of moral hazard persist within non-agency loan 
types, causing underwriting risks to be mispriced.  Our findings provide further evidence for an 
increase in government guaranteed loans, as a way of improving OTD and reducing subsequent 
foreclosures. 
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5.3.5 FSA/RHS Mortgages 
 FSA and RHS loans are the smallest loan type of all OTD loans, consisting of 0.66% of 
the total OTD industry in 2007.  We found that there was a strong negative relationship between 
FSA/RHS OTD volumes and foreclosure rates.  The results of this loan type are also in line 
Anderson et al. (2011) who conducted similar research in order to conclude a different finding.   
 14       𝑌 =   −0.2137𝑋 + 0.0065 
       t-stat               (-1.9032)            (5.1278) 
 
The linear regression analysis indicated a strong negative relationship, as in formula (14), 
where the FSA/RHS coefficient value of -0.2137 proves this government loan type resulted in 
less foreclosures in 2008.  The adjusted R-square value of 0.0498 or 4.98% demonstrates that 5% 
of the variation in the data analysis is explained by the regression fit; this is the fourth lowest 
adjusted R-square value calculated in the research.  Refer to appendix 7.1.10. 
 One drawback from utilizing the data on FSA/RHS loan types (and all other government 
loan types) is the small sample size of the mortgages that utilized.  This resulted in our two-
sample t-test not being statistically significant within a 95% confidence level for the slope 
coefficient.  The intercept term was strongly significant and produced a value that was above the 
two-tail critical t-stat with a t-value well over the critical, at 5.1278. Once again, the strong 
negative relationship and consistency with previous literature indicates that this type of mortgage 
performs well in the OTD market. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
At the beginning of the paper, we set out to expand the knowledge base of the OTD 
industry and to answer three questions:  
(I) Is there positive relationship between OTD rates and foreclosures in the US? 
(II) Is there a continued role for GSE’s in the OTD process?  
(III) Is there evidence to support the role of government guarantees and insurances on 
mortgages within the OTD industry?   
Through our detailed research and analysis, we have concluded that OTD of 1-4 family 
dwelling, originated mortgages on a statewide level increased foreclosure rates in 2007-08. There 
is a role for the government in the OTD industry through GSE’s, and the federal government 
should continue to be involved with mortgage guarantees and insurances. 
6.1 Is There a Positive Relationship Between OTD Rates and 
Foreclosures? 
 Yes.  The research has indicated that the increased prevalence of the OTD market on a 
statewide level in 2007 increases the likelihood of foreclosures the following year.  Having 
obtained the second highest level of certainty with our results, we are able to infer with a high 
level of confidence that the volume of OTD that exists in a particular state negatively affects the 
foreclosure rate the following year.  Our research was conducted on a highly robust level where 
all 1-4 family dwelling mortgages were analyzed and compared to the total foreclosure rate the 
following year; therefore, these results indicate that the OTD model should be used cautiously.  
Anderson et al. (2011), found evidence since 2002 which suggests that favourable economic 
conditions during the 1990s covered up poor underwriting quality and allowed foreclosure rates 
to only increase by 25% from 1993-2004, rather than double the rate if poor economic conditions 
had existed.  This research further supplements our findings, indicating that OTD has negatively 
influenced the US economy since the early 1990’s, peaking in 2007-08 when the economic 
conditions finally collapsed.  This means that the OTD model, a major tool used by banks to 
hedge credit risk and finance banking activities, has been a house of cards waiting to tumble for 
the last 25 years (Anderson et al. 2011).   
Since it is the government’s responsibility to regulate and protect users of the OTD 
market, it is very important for them to address these issues in order to prevent future finical 
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crises and too ensure stability for the global economy.  Foreclosures put stress on financial 
markets by increasing the volatility in the market and the likelihood of a liquidity crisis (Hull 
2012).   This led us to investigate the breakdown of the OTD industry, in order to determine the 
main cause of the defaults in the OTD industry and the positive relationship between OTD rates 
and foreclosures. 
6.2 Is There a Role for GSE’s Within the OTD Model? 
 Yes.  Our research indicated that there is a need for a government presence within the 
OTD industry as indicated by the negative relationship between GSE OTD and foreclosure rates; 
commercial banks also had a very strong negative relationship.  Although both institutions have 
an ability to create high quality loans and adhere to solid lending standards, the results indicate 
varied conclusions.  Commercial banks have a negative relationship by carefully selecting good 
quality loans to originate (using strong screening standards), while simultaneously funding the 
previously rejected applicants using an affiliate or subsidiary institution (Jiang et al. 2013).  This 
process is a negative hindrance on the economy.  Conversely, we believe that GSE’s have the 
ability to screen potential mortgage applicants effectively and extend loans to people who will not 
foreclose.  Unlike commercial banks, GSE’s do not try to profit from selling mortgage products 
to previously rejected applicants at inflated profit margins through their subsidiary institutions 
(Sarmiento 2012).  This is seen as a positive force for in the OTD industry and we advocate for a 
continued GSE role in the US, especially in high foreclosure states like California and Nevada, 
where the government’s role in OTD is well below the national average of 37.5% of OTD 
mortgages. 
 Commercial banks, credit unions, and life insurance companies have traditionally been 
strong lenders in residential and commercial loans due to their ability to screen lenders efficiently 
and extend mortgages to borrowers who have a good history of repayment (Apostolik et al. 
2009).  However, these entities negative regression results have been influenced by two main 
factors, producing a relationship between institutions and foreclosures that may be misleading.   
Firstly, any anomaly in the potential mortgage applicants credit score, the Fair Isaac 
Corporation score or FICO, can cause an otherwise sensible loan to be denied, especially when it 
falls below the “rule of thumb” credit score of 620 (Keys et al. 2010).   The conservative level of 
screening used by banks tends disqualify any applicants with poor credit histories and low-levels 
of documentation, producing above quality mortgages that are sold to the OTD market at a 
premium.  Meanwhile, the applicants that failed the commercial bank/life insurance/credit 
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union’s strenuous credit screening procedure are passed along to one of the many bank holding 
companies/affiliated institutions who then extend credit to these risky borrowers at a high level of 
profit; quickly selling them to the OTD market (Gaied et al. 2012).  This usually occurs off-
balance sheet to avoid scrutiny from investors.   
Secondly, previous research by Jiang et al. (2013) has indicated that commercial banks 
and credit unions tend to hold the poor quality mortgage originations on their balance sheet at 
cost to avoid taking a loss on their banking book, while selling the high quality loans to the OTD 
market at a profit.  The research shows that investors obtain further information ex post of the 
origination and will not buy OTDs that have characteristics that appear to be risky.  This means 
that banks inflate the negative relationship we found between OTD and foreclosures, by not 
securitizing poor quality loans because there is no investor demand, and instead holding them on 
or off the balance sheet. 
 On the other hand, GSE’s have a strong history of mortgage screening and lending 
practices, since the inception of the Farm Credit System in 1916; it now holds approximately $5 
trillion USD worth of mortgages in 2014 (“HMDA Data” 2014).  We believe that the results 
obtained from our research are indicative of continued government involvement in the industry, 
because states with the highest level of OTD mortgages from GSE’s had the lowest foreclosure 
rates the following year in 2007-08.   
 GSE’s do not use their strict lending requirements to deny undesirable applicants from 
regular credit, while simultaneously extending expensive credit from an affiliated institution at a 
large profit; GSE’s interact in the OTD market for different purposes and are meant to promote 
ease of access to the housing market (Shi 2012).  Secondly, GSE’s do not suffer from the same 
risks caused by moral hazard in the OTD market and are not profit driven like commercial banks 
(Sarmiento 2012).  Research has shown that GSE’s uphold underwriting standards within the 
OTD industry by segmenting loans into two strict categories: conforming and non-conforming.  
Any loan that is unwritten and approved according to agency standards can be purchased by a 
GSE for a small fee to the originating institution and sold as a securitization product.  This 
encourages other institutions to conform to strict lending guidelines in order sell the mortgage to 
the GSE immediately after origination, removing credit risk from the balance sheet and providing 
immediate profit to the originator.  We believe that GSE’s prominence in the mortgage industry 
should continue to persist. 
  28 
6.3 Is There a Role for Gov’t Mortgage Guarantees in the OTD 
Industry? 
 Yes.  The research and analysis supported a further need for a government presence in the 
issuance and guarantee of mortgages in the OTD industry.  The negative linear regression 
relationships between three types of government insured OTD mortgages and foreclosure rates 
indicate that states with higher government participation, results in less foreclosures the following 
year for 2007-08 .  Furthermore, the strong positive relationship between conventional loan types 
and foreclosures within the OTD industry promotes continued government support.  Without 
government support, many at-risk residential mortgage applicants would only be able to obtain 
capital by entering into a subprime or non-agency loan contract that would charge extremely high 
interest rates (Shi 2012).  Since all citizens require some form of housing, many applicants enter 
into a subprime agreement, only to find out they are unable to afford the monthly payments and 
subsequently foreclose.  Foreclosures are costly to all members of society and are a burden to the 
economy, and government sponsored mortgage insurance programs are therefore highly essential 
to the OTD industry (Apostolik et al. 2009). 
 Conventional loans (non-government insured or guaranteed) tend to exhibit higher 
foreclosure rates when the volume of OTD of this loan is high in a particular state.  This indicates 
that conventional loans are at a higher risk of default than the more conservative government 
guaranteed loans, such as FHA, VA, and FSA/RHS.  Our results and conclusion are further 
supported by Shi (2012), who conducted analysis on whether stricter mortgage lending standards, 
led to improved mortgage performance.  Since government guaranteed loans follow stringent 
guidelines in order for an applicant to receive funds, there are less defaults within the OTD 
market; this has been evidenced in the research through negative/neutral relationships between 
government guaranteed loans and foreclosures.  
 Another aspect of government guaranteed mortgages is that loans classified under this 
category are less likely to foreclose because the government will be more lenient with delinquent 
payments and other financial hurdles in times of economic hardship.  In other words, the 
government guarantees the timely payment of mortgage coupons to the corresponding OTD 
product, regardless of the applicant’s payment status (Demiroglu and James 2012).  This can be 
viewed as both a positive and negative factor because fewer foreclosures are a benefit to the 
economy; however, government bailouts are also a hindrance to economic stability and can 
promote information asymmetry within the financial industry (Hull 2012). We believe that the 
opportunities outweigh the risks because the cost of government payments for mortgage support 
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is much smaller, in dollar value, than the cost of foreclosures.  Moreover, the additional cost of 
supporting a citizen who just lost their house to foreclosure is incredibly high due welfare 
payments, housing costs, and other financial support.  We therefore advocate for continued 
government involvement in the OTD industry through three government guaranteed loan types, 
FHA, VA, and FSA/RHS. 
 Overall, the paper’s thorough analysis into OTD and foreclosure rates in the US in 2007-
08 has determined that OTD rates of all originated residential mortgages have a positive 
relationship with foreclosures.  Our results determined that GSE’s are a very strong player within 
the OTD industry and have a negative relationship with foreclosure rates; commercial and life 
insurance/credit unions also had a negative relationship, however these results are not deemed 
appropriate due to the low adjusted R-square value and previous academic literature.  
Furthermore, government sponsored mortgages had negative relationships with foreclosure rates, 
while conventional type loans had a strongly positive relationship.  These results indicate that a 
there is a role for GSE’s within the OTD industry, as evidenced through prime and subprime 
originated residential mortgages in the US.  Regardless of our papers data limitations, we 
advocate for GSE’s continued support in the OTD process and in the mortgage origination cycle. 
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7.0 Appendix 
7.1 Empirical Results 
7.1.1 Total OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Relationship between total OTD (prime and subprime) and the corresponding foreclosure 
rates on a state level.  We found that the foreclosure rate increases, as the percentage of total OTD 
increases, concluding a positive relationship between the two variables.  The t-stat analysis indicates that 
both standard error coefficient terms are significant with a 95% confidence (green); concluding that this 
relationship is significant.  Each point represents one of 51 states in the US. 
7.1.2 GSE OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Detailed breakdown of all originated OTD loans by purchaser type, by comparing the 
percentage of OTD of each financial institution to foreclosure rates in each state.  GSE’s, better known as 
prime mortgages or agency loans, were found to have a strong negative relationship between OTD rate 
and foreclosure rates the following year.  Both coefficients are statistically significant (green).  Each point 
represents one of 51 states in the US. 
Regression	  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	  Statistics
Multiple	  R 0.47677 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.2273 Intercept -­‐0.0349189 0.01059296 -­‐3.29643 0.00183
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.21154 Total	  OTD 0.06408445 0.016879294 3.796631 0.0004
Standard	  Error 0.00676 t	  Critical	  (two	  tail) 2.009575
Observations 51
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Multiple	  R 0.31768 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.10092 Intercept 0.02253363 0.007487627 3.009449 0.00413
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.08257 GSE -­‐0.0427898 0.018245356 -­‐2.34525 0.02311
Standard	  Error 0.0073 t	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7.1.3 Private OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Private institutions have historically been the underwriters and originators of subprime 
mortgages, or non-agency loans, which do not meet the strict guidelines of GSE’s.  Analysis indicated that 
there was an extremely strong positive relationship between the OTD rate of private institutions and 
foreclosure rates the following year; reinforced by the significant t-stat for both coefficients (green).  Each 
point represents one of 51 states in the US. 
7.1.4 Commercial Bank OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Commercial banks were found to have the strongest negative relationship of all the purchaser 
types examined in our research.  Commercial banks have demonstrated that they are very strong at 
containing risk during the OTD process; however they make up a small proportion of total OTD at 7.18%, 
the second smallest player in the market.  The intercept term was statistically greater than zero (green), 
while the slope term was not (red).  Each point represents one of 51 states in the US. 
Regression	  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	  Statistics
Multiple	  R 0.51307 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.26324 Intercept -­‐0.0061415 0.002849896 -­‐2.15498 0.0361
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.2482 Private 0.3408155 0.081453922 4.184151 0.00012
Standard	  Error 0.0066 t	  Critical	  (two	  tail) 2.009575
Observations 51
y	  =	  0.3408x	   -­‐ 0.0061
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  Significance	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Multiple	  R 0.23301 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.05429 Intercept 0.010936 0.003612509 3.02726 0.00393
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.03499 Commercial -­‐0.0807669 0.048155472 -­‐1.67721 0.09987
Standard	  Error 0.00748 t	  Critical	  (two	  tail) 2.009575
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7.1.5 Life Insurance/Credit Union OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Life insurance companies and credit unions consisted of approximately 11.36% of total OTD 
products in 2007.  The results indicate that there was a small negative relationship between 
insurance/credit union’s OTD and foreclosure rates in each US state indicating that the two variables 
move in opposite directions.  Both coefficients were statistically insignificant.  Each point represents one of 
51 states in the US. 
7.1.6 Others/Affiliate OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Affiliate institutions consist of bank holding companies and other off-balance sheet shell 
companies of large commercial banks.  This is the largest group of OTD players in the US, with 37.5% of 
all originated mortgages belonging to these institutions. Despite the large size of this purchasers market, 
there was a weak positive relationship between OTD rates and foreclosures.  The slope term is statistically 
significant and is statistically greater than zero (green); the intercept term is no significant (red).  Each 
point represents one of 51 states in the US. 
Regression	  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	  Statistics
Multiple	  R 0.10867 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.01181 Intercept 0.00933317 0.005586742 1.670593 0.10118
Adj.	  R	  Square -­‐0.00836 Insurance -­‐0.0369421 0.048278151 -­‐0.76519 0.44783
Standard	  Error 0.00765 t	  Critical	  (two	  tail) 2.009575
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  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	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Multiple	  R 0.36137 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.13059 Intercept -­‐0.0138575 0.007073467 -­‐1.95909 0.05581
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.11284 Others 0.05065446 0.018671682 2.712903 0.00918
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  Error 0.00717 t	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7.1.7 Conventional OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: Conventional mortgages, as classified by the HMDA, are all mortgages that are not eligible 
for government sponsorship or support and may include prime, subprime, or Alt-A loans.  There was a 
weak positive relationship between conventional mortgage in the OTD market and foreclosure rates in the 
following year.  Both coefficients were statistically significant (green).  Each point represents one of 51 
states in the US. 
7.1.8 FHA OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description:  FHA mortgages are the most common form of government support within the mortgage OTD 
realm, with a market share of 6.3% in 2007.  The relationship reveals that there is weak positive 
correlation between foreclosure rates and OTD rates of FHA loans; this is the opposite of what was 
expected.  Both coefficients were statistically significant (green).  Each point represents one of 51 states in 
the US. 
Regression	  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	  Statistics
Multiple	  R 0.35433 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.12555 Intercept -­‐0.0516988 0.021451927 -­‐2.40999 0.01975
Adj.	  R	  Square 0.1077 Conventional 0.06252949 0.023574651 2.652404 0.01074
Standard	  Error 0.0072 t	  Critical	  (two	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Adj.	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7.1.9 VA OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: VA guaranteed loans are loans that are guaranteed to war veterans and their families, and 
are highly documented and well tracked by numerous government agencies.  The regression analysis 
specifies that there is a negative relationship between VA guaranteed loans and foreclosure rates in the 
following year.  The intercept coefficient was statistically significant (green).  Each point represents one of 
51 states in the US. 
7.1.10 FSA/RHS OTD VS Foreclosures 
 
Description: FSA and RHS loans are the smallest loan type in the OTD market, consisting of 0.66% of the 
total OTD industry in 2007.  We found that there was a very strong negative relationship between 
FSA/RHS OTD volumes and foreclosure rates.  The intercept coefficient was statistically significant 
(green).  Each point represents one of 51 states in the US. 
 
 
 
 
Regression	  Statistics Statistical	  Significance	  Statistics
Multiple	  R 0.25463 Coefficients Standard	  Error t	  Stat P-­‐value
R	  Square 0.06484 Intercept 0.00774412 0.001756605 4.408568 5.7E-­‐05
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7.2 HMDA Raw Data 
 
 
Raw OTD Data for 51 US States 
Source: FFIEC (2014).  HMDA Data. 
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7.3 Foreclosure.com Raw Data 
 
Foreclosures in 2008 by Percent of Housing Units Under Foreclosure 
Source: Lucy, W. H., and Herlitz, J. (2009). 
State Total	  Housing	  Units	  (2007) Total	  Foreclosures	  (2008) Percentage	  of	  Foreclosure
Alabama 2,137,012 3,495 0.16%
Alaska 282,271 839 0.30%
Arizona 2,667,550 60,292 2.26%
Arkansas 1,287,472 5,342 0.41%
California 13,308,705 342,445 2.57%
Colorado 2,127,358 29,299 1.38%
Connecticut 1,438,548 9,414 0.65%
Delaware 388,619 215 0.06%
District	  of	  Columbia N/A N/A 0.12%
Florida 8,716,601 173,231 1.99%
Georgia 3,961,643 22,837 0.58%
Hawaii 506,751 349 0.07%
Idaho 631,022 4,999 0.79%
Illinois 5,246,116 84,523 1.61%
Indiana 2,777,953 6,587 0.24%
Iowa 1,329,388 1,186 0.09%
Kansas 1,219,100 985 0.08%
Kentucky 1,906,198 3,713 0.19%
Louisiana 1,858,586 1,006 0.05%
Maine 696,681 397 0.06%
Maryland 2,318,430 3,312 0.14%
Massachusetts 2,722,323 7,861 0.29%
Michigan 4,526,914 17,839 0.39%
Minnesota 2,304,473 8,834 0.38%
Mississippi 1,254,936 1,850 0.15%
Missouri 2,647,379 12,762 0.48%
Montana 435,586 842 0.19%
Nebraska 780,592 2,345 0.30%
Nevada 1,102,409 45,147 4.10%
New	  Hampshire 594,126 1,007 0.17%
New	  Jersey 3,498,786 15,786 0.45%
New	  Mexico 862,095 2,750 0.32%
New	  York 7,940,072 13,198 0.17%
North	  Carolina 4,124,066 5,432 0.13%
North	  Dakota 310,438 42 0.01%
Ohio 5,065,254 14,848 0.29%
Oklahoma 1,623,100 5,678 0.35%
Oregon 1,609,764 10,944 0.68%
Pennsylvania 5,478,158 10,320 0.19%
Rhode	  Island 450,877 1,147 0.25%
South	  Carolina 2,022,033 2,873 0.14%
South	  Dakota 356,264 115 0.03%
Tennessee 2,724,979 5,978 0.22%
Texas 9,433,149 36,151 0.38%
United	  States 127,895,430 1,009,485 0.79%
Utah 925,295 9,563 1.03%
Vermount 311,420 101 0.03%
Virginia 3,273,206 7,380 0.23%
Washington 2,744,324 15,064 0.55%
West	  Virginia 882,631 601 0.07%
Wisconsin 2,558,278 9,499 0.37%
Wyoming 242,344 86 0.04%
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7.4 HMDA Data Breakdown 
 
 
 
Description: Breakdown of HMDA data by category.  Hold refers to all mortgages that were not 
sold to the OTD Market in 2007; sold refers to all mortgages that were sold by the originating 
institution within the year (studied within our research paper); purchaser and loan type are 
breakdowns of mortgages in the OTD market (percentage and amount of loans provided).   
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